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PLEA BARGAINING IN ENGLAND*
PHILIP A. THOMAS**
In England and Wales plea bargaining is a little
discussed subject into which insufficient research
has been undertaken.' This is in marked contrast
to the United States, where extensive and sophis-
ticated literature on the topic has developed. In the
* The body of this paper was completed in September
1977. Since that date the work of J. BALDWIN & M.
MC:CONVII.E, NEGoTIATED JUSTICE (1977) has been
published which all serious students of English plea
bargaining should notice. Four cases have been noted,
two of which being reported: R. v. Bird, The Times
(London). Dec. 7. 1977, at 2, col. 7; R. v. Ryan, The
Times (London). Dec. 13, 1977, at 2, col. 8; R. v. Atkin-
son. reported in The Times (London), Dec. 10, 1977, at
22. col. 5: R. v. Llewellyn, The Times (London), Mar. 3,
1978, at col. 8.
** LL.B, LL.M. Wales, LL.M University of Michigan.
Senior Lecturer in Law, University College, Cardiff.
-We all know, if only from informal contacts with
advocates, that it does go on, though it is impossible to
guage its extent." Editorial Note, 1970 CRIM. L. REX'.
310: "In Britain today very little is known of the informal
bargaining processes which go on between prosecution
and defence with regard to a negotiated plea of guilty."
Thomas. An Exploration of Plea Bargaining, 1969 CRIM. L.
RE-v. 68: "Most defendants plead guilty. Yet there is
some reason to fear that not all these defendants actually
regard themselves as guilty. Little research has yet been
done on this problem." M. ZANDER, CASES AND MATE-
RIAI-S ON [HE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 135-36 (2d. ed.
1973):
Plea bargaining has been the subject of discussion
inside and outside the court rooms of the United
States for many years. It is only recently, however,
that our own courts' views of such practices have
been expressed, and that English writers have com-
mented at any length on our own versions of these
practices.
Davies. Sentences for Sale: A New Look at Plea Bargaining in
England and America. 1970 CRim. L. REX'. 150: "'The
'discount on punishment allowed by the courts on a plea
of guilty is now public knowledge, but there has been
little public discussion of it." Williams, The Times, (Lon-
don). Feb. 25. 1976. at 15, col. 5-6. See also A. BOInroMs
& J. MC:C.E-N. DEiENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PR(x:.
Et.ss 123-24 (1976): S. MCCABE & R. PURVEs, BY-PASS-
IN. I IIIJURY (1972): Heberling, Conviction Without Trial,
2 AN(.I.o-Am. L. REx. 428 (1973): Purves, That Plea
Bargaining Business: Some Conclusions from Research, 1971
CRI. L. Ri:\'. 470: Reiss, Public Prosecutors in the United
States oj America, 5 JUR REx. 19-20 (1960): Seifman. The
Phea Bargaini g Process: Trial by Error?. 127 Niw L. J. 551
(1977): White. Newark & Samuels, Offences Taken into
omuideration. 1970 CRim. L. REv. 311, 321-22.
United States plea bargaining is sufficiently
"open" to have its own subject heading, "Plea
Bargaining" in the Index to Legal Periodicals.2 Yet, to
look too readily and receptively across the Atlantic
for authoritative explanations of plea bargaining
introduces a basic trap of comparative analysis, for
the researcher is not comparing like with like.
3
There is less pressure on the criminal courts,4 no
public prosecutors with discretion on sentencing
recommendation, 5 and a more flexible judicial
sentencing system in England, all of which are
considered as factors which promote plea bargain-
ing in the United States. Nevertheless, the English
courts, particularly those at the base of the hierar-
chy, are under growing work pressure, and the
close professional and social relationships of the
legal actors in court make it possible, sometimes
even necessary,6 for deals to be arranged. Common
'This category has been operative since 1970. Even in
the U.S. there is opinion which states that the full extent
of plea bargaining is unknown. "The truth is that we just
do not know how common such a system is." Enker,
Perspectives on Plea Bargaining 113 in Appendix A, THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, ch. 12 (1967).
3 This view has been expounded by some English
scholars. "[T]he etiology of the U.S. situation ... differs
from the English at almost every level." Purves, supra
note 1, at 475. "In England ... there is neither the
structure nor the bargaining power to nurture the sys-
tem." A. BOrrOMs &J. MCCLEAN, supra note 1, at 124.
Davies, supra note 1, at 221, points out the major features
distinguishing the two systems.
4 The U.S. predicament has been described as follows:
If all defendants should combine to refuse to plead
guilty, and should dare to hold out, they could
break down the administration of criminal justice
in any state in the Union.... The prosecutor is like
a man with a revolver who is cornered by a mob.
... The truth is that a criminal court can operate
only by inducing a great mass of actually guilty
defendants to plead guilty.
H. LUMMUS, THE TRIALJUDGE 46 (1937).
s Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 L. & Soc. REV. 331
(1970).
6 Research conducted by the author and G. Mungham
on the Cardiff duty solicitor scheme and criminal advo-
cacy indicates that busy practitioners are sometimes will-
ing to arrange a "deal" on behalf of a client, which,
supposedly, is in his best interests. However, pressure of
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to both systems are the defendants: the smart, the
stupid, the frightened and the confident. All are
anxious to be found not guilty or, alternatively, to
minimize their sentences. Is it that the English
system excludes judicial plea bargaining, or has it
produced a number of effective masking techniques
and principles which, while publicly concealing its
existence, privately support the possibility of such
activity?
Statistical information regarding the magistrates
courts, where over 90% of all criminal trials are
heard, indicates a high incidence of guilty pleas.
Zander found that 80% of defendants in the Lon-
don magistrates courts pleaded guilty.7 Bottoms
and McClean discovered in their Sheffield study
of 1,316 trials that 93% pleaded guilty to all charges
and a further 2% pleaded guilty to one or more
charges.
8
Much more information is available about guilty
pleas in the higher courts, although structural
changes in the courts' systems must be recognized
when considering the earlier studies. As a whole,
the various papers record a proportion pleading
guilty of between 55% and 75%. Gibson established
an overall guilty plea rate of 75.5% in 1956.9 The
rate dropped to 48% by 1965 according to a study
undertaken for the police,10 and in 1967 Rose found
that the rate had risen to 57%.11 There is some
time and conveyor belt operations of certain "successful"
solicitors sometimes brings client-orientated values into
question. A REPORT ON THE DTrrY SOLICITOR SCHEME
OPERATING IN THE CARDIFF MAGISTRATES' COURTS,
1973-74 (1976); Thomas and Mungham, Duty Solicitor
Schemes: In Whose Interest?, 127 NEW L. J. 180 (1977); see
generally D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S
IN CHARGE? (1974) and Blumberg, The Practice of Law as
a Confidence Game, I L. & Soc. REv. 15 (1967).
7 Zander, Unrepresented Defendants in Magistrates' Courts,
1969 CRIM. L. REV. 632, 639.
8 A. BOTTOMS & J. MCCLEAN, supra note 1, at 105.
The trend of these findings is similar to that of the
U.S.-31,170 of the 48,244 cases filed in federal district
courts in 1975 were disposed of through guilty pleas.
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, Table 53, at 264 (1975).
According to an earlier estimate guilty pleas accounted
for almost 90% of all federal and state convictions. D.
NEWMAN, THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-
CENCE WIrHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966).
9 E. GIBSON, TIME SPENT AWAITING TRIAL, Table 6,
at 9 (1960).
10Associtn of Chief Police Officers, Trial byJuiy, 116
NEW L.J. 928-29 (1966).
11 G. RosE, ROYAL COMMISSION ON ASSIZES AND
QUARTER SESSIONS 1966-69. SPECIAL STATISTICAL
SURVEY, Table 22, at 34 (1971).
evidence that the rate picked up at the close of the
1960's12, but fell to just under 60% in 1972.13 The
data of Bottoms and McClean ih 1971-72 indicate
that overall, 65% pleaded guilty to all charges; 10%
to one or more; and 25% not guilty to all charges.
14
While it is conceded publicly that plea bargaining
is an essential feature to the continued operation
of the lower courts in the United States,1 5 and that
it probably takes place in England, the above
figures do not present statistical evidence of the
incidence or frequency of this practice. Indeed,
reliable information has proved to be most difficult
to obtain. 16 Consequently, this article departs from
the traditional focus upon inferior courts, where
rough justice may be expected to be the order of
the day, 17 and concentrates on the superior courts,
where cases are heard by a jury and a professional
judge and where legal representation by a barrister
is common practice. I ignore the negotiations re-
garding offenses and pleading which may occur at
various stages between the defendant and the po-
lice, the prosecution and defense barristers and
solicitors, and concentrate instead upon an exami-
nation of the role and relationship of the judge.
counsel and defendant. No attempt is made to
quantify the number of occasions when judicial
plea bargaining occurs. This article builds upon
reported cases with a view to discovering whether
they illustrate the existence of a procedural and
professional framework which provides the oppor-
tunity for covert judicial plea bargaining.
Two categories of judicial plea bargaining are
considered. The first is express or overt plea bargain-
ing and the second is implied or covert judicial plea
bargaining. Express involvement of the judiciary
in this process was unequivocally prohibited by the
12 See generally Zander, Are Too Many Professional Crimi-
nals Avoiding Conviction: A Study of Britain's Two Busiest
Courts, 37 MOD. L. REV. 28 (1974).3
LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, STATisTrics
ON JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATION, Tables 3-2 and 5-5
(1973). But see S. DELL, SILENT IN COURT (1971), where
she indicates that in a limited study 87% of all defendants
entered guilty pleas.
14 A. BO-roMs &J. MCCLEAN, supra note 1, at 108.
" Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971),
where Chief Justice Burger stated that plea bargaining
was in effect "an essential component of the administra-
tion of justice."
16The work of J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, NE-
GOTIATED JUSTICE (1977), has proved to be the most
recent example of the problems arising from the sensitive
area of plea bargaining.
17 But see Jones, As I See It, 141 Jus-. P. 406 (1977).
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former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, in the
leading case of R. v. Turner:'
8
The judge should ... never indicate the sentence
which he is minded to impose. A statement that, on
a plea of guilty, he would impose one sentence but
that, on a conviction following a plea of not guilty,
he would impose a severer sentence is one which
should never be made. 19
The reason for this prohibition is that to allow
judicial participation "could be taken to be undue
pressure on the accused, thus depriving him of that
complete freedom of choice which is essential."20
By overtly entering the proceedings the judge runs
the grave risk of suggesting to the public that both
he and the office he holds are involved principally
in the swift, cost-effective administration ofjustice
rather than the independent search for and protec-
tion of the truth and the safeguarding of the pre-
sumably innocent defendant.2 ' Two major public
expectations are placed in jeopardy. The first is the
operation of the adversary system, which hinges on
the independence and neutrality of the judge. The
second is the presumed innocence of the accused
until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of
his peers, the jury. These expectations would be
frustrated by open judicial participation. The re-
sult would be a short-circuiting of the trial by
proffering a reduced sentence in exchange for the
defendant foregoing his right to a jury trial.
The trial judge may become overtly involved in
two ways. The first, and most obvious, is by com-
munication in court to the defendant. For example,
in R. v. Barnes,"2 Mr. Justice King Hamilton, in the
absence of the jury, commented adversely on the
waste of time caused by hopeless defenses and
"8 119701 2 All E.R. 281. See also R. v. Forde, [1923] 2
K.B. 403.
'9 [1970] 2 All E.R. at 285.
20 Id. The guilty plea must be "express and voluntary."
Powlter's Case, [1610] 11 Co. Rep. 29a, 77 E.R. 1181; R.
v. Forde, [1923] 2 K.B. 403. The defendant must make
his plea personally, R. v. Heyes, [1950] 34 Crim. App.
161, 162; R. v. Ali Tasamuling, 1971 CRIM. L. REv. 441.
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan 356 F. Supp. 244,
254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966): "When a judge becomes a partici-
pant in plea bargaining he brings to bear the full force
and majesty of his office .... His commitment has an all
pervasive and compelling influence in inducing the ac-
cused to yield his right to trial." Judge Weinfeld, 256 F.
Supp. at 255, stated that judicial bargaining is more
coercive than prosecutorial bargaining.
21 See G. Williams, The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1976,
at 15, col. 5 where "discount" on sentencing was de-
scribed as an "unhappy necessity."
22[1970] 55 Crim. App. 100.
invited the defendant to reconsider his position:
"I think it right I should tell you [counsel] in the
presence and hearing of your client that I take a
very serious view indeed of hopeless cases, without
a shadow of a defence, being conducted at public
expense. ' 23 Defense counsel indicated that he had
given similar advice to his lay client, and then
offered to withdraw from the case. The judge
expressed the view that any other counsel would
be bound to tender similar advice, and then asked
the accused whether he wished his present counsel
to represent him or whether he wished to defend
himself. On seeking self-representation and an ad-
journment for one day the judge insisted that the
case be heard immediately. Barnes then agreed to
retain the original counsel.
Either he will have to defend himself-I do not think
it right I should &ontinue to adjourn the case so that
a series of counsel can offer him advice which he
continues to reject. If he does not like the advice
counsel have given him, and solicitors presumably,
and the advice which, in the effect, this intelligent
youth will appreciate I have given him through you,
he will have to defend himself, if he does not wish
you to continue.
On appeal, Lord Chief Justice Parker expressed
"great sympathy" for trial judges faced with "a
number of hopeless cases which clogged the ma-
chine" and although the trial judge had applied
"extreme pressure on the appellant to plead
Guilty,"25 the court did not find for the appellant
on these grounds although they were considered
"improper." The appeal was successful because
counsel was forced into revealing what advice he
had given his client. "Counsel would appear to the
appellant to be siding with the judge .... [Counsel
would be gravely handicapped in conducting the
defence .... ". Similarly, in R. v. Nelson,'7 the
Recorder's statement to the defendant at sentenc-
ing that he could be separately tried and sentenced
for other alleged offenses if he refused to have those
other offenses taken into account was seen by the
Court of Appeal as a threat towards the accused.
The second fashion in which the judge may seek
a "bargain" with the defendant is by using counsel
to transfer information to his lay client in the
expectation that the source will be disclosed. Once





2[1967] 1 All E.R. 358.
[Vol. 69
PLEA BARGAINING IN ENGLAND
advice of the judge are considered intolerable by
appeal courts as illustrated by R. v. Inns.Y8 The trial
judge, Mr. Justice Ellison, ran foul of the dicta of
Lord Parker in Turner's case. In the privacy of
chambers the judge indicated to defense counsel
the nature of the sentence he would impose should
the defendant be found guilty. Moreover, by virtue
of his refusal to allow a trial before another judge,
upon request of counsel, he placed the defendant
in such a position of serious apprehension as to
believe his trial had taken place before it had
commenced.29 The Court of Appeal quashed the
conviction and ordered a new trial. At the same:
time the court expressed its surprise and concern
at this example of overt judicial intervention: "It
was a most unfortunate occurrence and the court
was surprised that it had ever happened. It was to
be hoped that that kind of interview between a
judge and counsel would not take place again."
3°
Although a similar exchange took place in R. v.
Brook 31 it must be recognized that the exposure of
the judge's attempted intervention depends en-
tirely on the attitude of counsel towards the private
conversation and the use made and form of pres-
entation of the information in subsequent conver-
sations with the defendant. This is a feature which
I now consider in some detail.
At this point I turn to covert judicial plea bar-
gaining. This is made possible by three features,
supported and illustrated by a series of cases within
which R. v. Turner plays a key role. The first is the
nature of the relationship which exists between
counsel and the lay client, as illustrated by R. v.
Turner and R v. Peace.32 The second is the access
counsel has to the trial judge.in the privacy of his
chambers, as endorsed in R v. Cain and third is
28 [1974] 60 Crim. App. 231.
2 The appellant was not given a free choice as to'
his plea. The whole basis of a plea on arraignment
is that ... an accused freely said in open court what
he was going to do. When the accused is making a
plea of guilty under pressure and threats, he does
not make a free plea and .... All that follows
thereafter is ... a nullity.
Id (Lawton,'LJ.).
'1 Lawton L.J., The Times (London), Dec. 13, 1974, at
12, col. 3. It could be argued that this is "overt" only
because defense counsel chose to make it so.
31 1970 CRIM. L. REy. 600. The judge told counsel
that if convicted he would send the appellant to jail.
Counsel passed on the information. The Court of Appeal
conceded that the appellant did not have a free choice of
plea and a venire de novo was ordered.
32 The Times (London), Nov. 28, 1975, at 6, col. 7. See
also The Sun, Nov. 28, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
3 The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1976, at 11.
his professional knowledge and experience that .a
"discount" is given by the judge.on the sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea. Thus, although no overt
bargaining occurs-for the judge neither formally
nor publically enters the process-structural char-
acteristics are established to allow and encourage
the operation of covert practices. As will be seen,
the defendant's freedom of choice, which is vital to
a fair trial, is "protected" by ensuring his ignorance
of the reality of relationship between various
professional actors in the trial. The confidence of
the defendant, or "mark,"3' is maintained by with-
holding information fundamental to the exercise of
the realistic choice34 which, theoretically, this per-
son is required to make. Indeed, this process must
be private, for the formal rules in R. v. Turner
exclude the participation, or even knowledge, on
the part of the defendant who is the subject of a
plea bargaining operation. This contrasts with the
practice in the United States where the accused is
more likely to be party to the charade of voluntary
pleading' and points towards an explanation why
plea bargaining is generally recognized there but
not in England. The effect of covert judicial par-
ticipation is that it allows a benefit to be offered to
the ignorant defendant, via his counsel, in exchange
for a guilty plea. On the public level the formal
independence of the judiciary is preserved by a
series of social structures, rules and cases which
simultaneously allow trials to be expedited by
means of this clandestine process.
The first element whicli fosters covert bargaining
is the traditional relationship between the barrister
and his lay client as spelled out by Lord Parker in
R. v. Turner: counsel "must be completely free to do
what is his duty, namely, to give the accused the
best advice he can, and if need be, advice in strong
3 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 24.
35 R. v. Barnes, [1970] 55 Crim App. 100, provides an
illustration of "realistic choice" in another context. The
appellant either accepted the "advice" of counsel, solici-
tors and the judge or he represented himself. Parker,
L.C.J., in the Court of Appeal: "However, as the law
stands, it is an accused person's right to have counsel
under legal aid to defend him should he elect to plead
Not Guilty." Id at 104.
-6 Most defendants assume the real purpose of both the
official sentencing procedure and judicial interrogation
of the defendant is to protect the image of the system. A
Connecticut defendant says of the inquiry: "If anybody's
in the court room you know you gotta make a little show
for them." J. CASPER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE CON-
SUMER PERSPECTIVE 84 (1972). Peter Randolph, an
accused person in the U.S., described his trial as follows:
"It's all a phony fucking game." A. RosE-rr & D. CRES-
SEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 46 (1976).
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terms."37 Although formally and publicly it is the
client who is seen to make the decisionss8 the
decision-making process is subject to the personal
and private relationship of counsel and the ac-
cused. This follows a traditional pattern of domi-
nance where client's interests are considered best
served through the exercise of predominant control
by the lawyer, and problem-solving and indeed
effective decision-making is delegated to the profes-
sional.a Client participation in evaluating and
coming to decisions is minimized.4° This relation-
ship is based on the assumption that the client is
free to dismiss the barrister if they fail to agree on
the proper course of action. 41 Despite the absence
of personal orders or commands from counsel this
assumption does not recognize the reality of struc-
tural coercion,4 2 and finally, it introduces a vague-
ness about words like "consent" and
.,agreement .' A3 This relationship of dominance via
37 2 All E.R. at 285.
'4 This is reflected by rules such as the one that the
question of the plea must be put to the defendant person-
ally and a plea of guilty made on his behalf by his
barrister or solicitor may be quashed at least if the
defendant shows dissatisfaction with a plea. R. v. Wake-
field Justices exparte Butterworth, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1181;
R. v. Ellis, 1975 GRIM. L. REv. 389; R. v. Gowerton
Justices ex parte Davies, 1974 CRiM. L. REv. 253. See
notes 20, 29 supra.
39 "They [clients] must trust their lawyer, thereby giv-
ing him authority-as an expert-to do things they only
vaguely understand." A. RosETT and D. CRESSEY, supra
note 36. See generally H. BECKER, THE NATURE OF A
PROFESSION: EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS
(1962); T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1952); and
D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6. This relationship is pre-
sented in the form of "service" of the lawyer. See for
example, evidence of the Council of the Law Society to
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission where their
own characteristics of a profession are couched in terms
of service; A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY SERVICES OF SOL-
ICrIORS IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN RELATION To RE.-
STRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING (1976): see also Hadfield,
Two Models of the Legal Profession, 2 N. IRELAND LEGAL
Q. 94-105 (1975).
"oThis is achieved not simply through personal rela-
tionships of the lawyer/client but by the use of props to
create distance and alienation: the court, police presence,
language, dress and ceremony. For a recent explanation
of this see Carlen, The Staging of Magistrates Justice, 16
BRIT. J. CRI1M. 48 (1976); Carlen, Remedial Routines for the
Maintenance of Control in the Magistrates Courts, 2 BRIr. J.
LAW & Soc. 10 1-17 (1974); King, Roles and Relationships
in Magistrates Courts, 1976 LEGAL ACT. GROUP BULL.
7-9.
4' But see R. v. Barnes, [1970] 55 Crim. App. 100.
42 See note 40 supra.
43 R. v. Richards, [1967] 51 Grim. App. 266. Counsel
is not "a person in authority," unlike a policeman, for
the purpose of pleading inducement. Therefore, any
duty was recently illustrated in R. v. Peace." Peace
contended that his plea of guilty was a nullity
because he had lost his power to make a deliberate
and voluntary choice. On the day of his trial, he
stated, he met leading counsel, who told him that
he did not have a chance of acquittal and that if
he pleaded guilty he would probably get a borstal
(reformatory school) rather than a prison sentence
and that the sentence could be three to four years.
Lord Chief Justice Widgery felt that the facts did
not come close enough to an improper plea of
guilty. An accused who pleaded guilty following
and adopting the advice of counsel, "albeit unhap-
pily and with reluctance," 45 could not be said to
have lost his power to make a voluntary and delib-
erate choice.4 6 Widgery, L.C.J. stated that:
It would be a serious matter if it was accepted as a
principle that, where counsel gave strong advice to
a client indicating the prospect of his being found
guilty as an alternative to pleading guilty, it was
then to be said that the plea was really not the
accused's plea but something which had been forced
on him.
47
According to traditional theory, the client who is
passive, obeys instructions and trusts the profession
without criticism, with few questions or requests
for information is preferable to the client who is
critical, questioning and anxious to participate
fully." Given that lawyer domination operates,
and is encouraged by means including case law, it
is crucial that if discussions take place between
statement by counsel is tested not by whether it is capable
of operating as an inducement, but whether in fact it
impaired the defendant's free choice in making a confes-
sion of guilt.
44The Times (London), Nov. 28, 1975, at 6, col. 7.
45Id.
46 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973).
The sole inquiry of a federal court reviewing a guilty plea
conviction on a habeas corpus petition is "whether the
guilty plea had been made intelligently and voluntarily
with the advice of competent counsel." Again, the formal
responsibility and decision is that of the defendant. In
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1969), it was
said: "Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have
been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible
death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was vol-
untarily and intelligently made and we have no reason
to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt is truthful."47 The Times, supra note 44.
4 Parsons, Social Structure and Dynamic Process: The Case
of Modern Medical Practice in THE SOCIAL SYSTEM at 437
(1952); Parsons, Research with Human Subjects and the
"Professional Complex," 1969 DAEDALUS 358; Kadushin,
Social Distance Between Client and Professional, 67 AM. J.
Soc. 517-31 (1962).
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counsel and the judge that they be done covertly.
A publicized dialogue might, apart from possibly
running foul of R. v. Turner, produce an apparent
issue of conflict in the mind of the client, thereby
jeopardizing his relationship with the barrister, and
making the client less susceptible to the "indepen-
dent" advice of his counsel.4 9
The second element in this framework is the
relationship between counsel and the judge, as
illustrated by R. v. Turner and R. v. Cain.LW The
court in Turner's case stated that there must be
"freedom of access between counsel and the judge"
and that such private access should be to the judge
in chambers, thereby excluding the defendant.
This private channel of communication was based
on the possibility that certain matters concerning
the case and the client are best kept from the
client.5' The court said that there might be cases
when the defendant was suffering from an incura-
ble disease such as cancer and did not know that
fact himself. A private talk with the judge was
appropriate and it was proper for both counsel to
attend. This restricted access operated in R. v. Cain.
The trial judge, Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson,
sent for leading counsel from both sides and told
them that he thought the appellant had no defense.
Further, if the appellant persisted in his plea of not
guilty he would receive a very severe sentence, but
that a change of plea before he went into the
witness box was bound to make a considerable
difference. Defense counsel took the view that he
had no choice but to go to the defendant in the
cells and tell him exactly what the judge had said.
As a result of this information the defendant
changed his plea to guilty on three counts which
were accepted by the prosecution. On appeal
Widgery, L.C.J., approved and applied Turner in-
sofar as the defendant no longer had "a free choice
in the matter" after hearing what the judge had
indicated. The direction of the court was that there
should be trial venire de novo for there had been
excessive pressure exerted on the defendant to
change his plea to guilty. Whereas the appeal court
confirmed the strict non-intervention of judges, it
also provided an illustration of the situation in
which "access" to the judge could be used by
defense counsel provided that such information or
opinion as the client receives is believed to stem
49 See R. v. Barnes, [1970] 55 Crim. App. 100.
5 The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
Seifman, The Rise and Fall of Cain, 1976 CRIM. L. REV.
556.
5' [19701 2 All E.R. at 285.
from the barrister and not the judge. Widgery,
L.C.J., indicated that it was not uncommon for a
defense counsel who did not know the judge well,
and who was unfamiliar with the tariff of sentenc-
ing, to seek guidance from the judge as to what
sentence he had in mind so that he might accord-
ingly advise his client.52 This private communica-
tion described in Cain's case is far removed from
the example of terminal cancer originally offered
in Turner's case and allows the judicial will to
percolate through to the defendant without breach-
ing the rules laid down in Turner regarding unfair
pressure. The client is open to persuasion from his
barristeroa as is counsel from the judge. English
plea bargaining has been described as a "delicate
mutual back-scratching system."5' It is perhaps not
suprising that such a relationship between judge
and counsel should exist considering the common
training, work, social and educational processes
that they have undergone.55 These patterns are
reinforced because relatively few people are in-
volved.5 As Widgery, L.C.J., stated in R. v. Peace:
One of the advantages that flowed from the close
relationship between judge and barrister was that
the barrister in that situation could go to the judge
and ask him for guidance. If the judge felt disposed
to give it to him, counsel would then have a reliable
idea of what sort of sentence his client faced, and
could advise him properly. But the whole point
would be destroyed if he disclosed what the judge
had told him. The confidentiality in their relation-
ship would be broken.
57
52 Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 931 (1972). "To deprive the
attorney of the opportunity of talk to the judge about a
guilty plea before a defendant has made up his mind to
plead guilty, would deprive him of one of the most
valuable tools of his defence." See Restructuring the Plea
Bagaining, 82 YALE LJ. 286 (1972).
See S. McCABE & R. PURVES, supra note 1, at 9,
which showed that in their study of defendants who
changed their plea that this was done in most, if not all
cases, after the defendant received "certain good advice"
from his legal representative. This is especially the case
with late or last minute changes of plea where counsel,
after reviewing the brief and assessing the evidence,
speaks urgently to solicitor and defendant in a conference
held, in all too many cases immediately before the trial
is due to start.
5 Parker, Copping a Plea, 135 JusT. P. 408 (1971).
55See generally H. CECIL, THE ENGLISH JUDGE (1970);
JusTrCE, THEJUDICIARY (1972).
"' Because barristers are members of regional circuits
they usually operate in a few courts. Since the Courts Act
1971 certain criminal judges (i.e. circuit judges) are also
located in particular areas. Thus, barristers and judges
are in constant professional contact.
" Lord Widgery, The Times, supra note 44. However,
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Should this be the state of the law,58 the way is
clear for the will of the judge to be imposed upon
the defendant by means of his undisclosed agent,
the barrister, whom the defendant wrongly believes
to be the principal acting independently in his best
interests. Informal discussions in the privacy of
judge's chambers5 9 can be changed into the consid-
ered opinion of counsel to his client as to the likely
sentencing policy of the judge should the plea of
not guilty fail.
The third, and final feature, is the role of sent-
encing "discount" which the judge operates at his
discretion. The reasons for the operation of dis-
count in this particular manner are to dissuade
defendants who have no defense from having their
day in court, possibly distressing witnesses as well
as adding to the general inconvenience and loss of
time and public money within the framework of
it should be stated that a Practice Direction has been
issued, The Times (London), July 27, 1976, at 5, col. 3:
"R. v. Cain has been subject to further consideration by
the Court of Appeal. Insofar as it is inconsistent with R.
v. Turner the latter decision should prevail." See also 162
J. CRIM. L. 96 (1977).
" The Practice Direction set out in note 57 supra, refers
to the Turner rule which states "the judge should ...
never indicate the sentence which he is minded to impose
... where any such discussion on sentence has taken place
betweenjudge and counsel, counsel for the defence should
disclose this to the accused and inform him of what took
place." However, as stated earlier, such is the relationship
between counsel and his judge that informal discussions
of a general nature might not be seen by counsel as "plea-
bargaining" or matters which fall narrowly'within the
terms of Turner. Even if they did counsel might still
believe that to talk and advise accordingly might still be
in the best interests of his client or perhaps in his own
best interests given the continuing relationship he must
sustain with the judge. See The Times (London), Feb. 25,
1976, at 15, col. 5:
The dangers inherent in the acceptable practice
[discount for guilty pleas] are manifest from the
reported case [R. v. Cain] which is exceptional only
in that the trial judge's advice on plea was passed
on by counsel to the defendant, rather than being
expressed as counsel's opinion after conferring with
the judge.
" On one occasion I witnessed such an event in a
judge's chambers. Counsel were invited in, I was intro-
duced, wigs were removed and during the conversation
the judge's thinking on the likely sentence was stated
briefly should the defendant be found guilty. At the time
the term "plea-bargaining" did not occur to me and I
feel confident it would have shocked the other lawyers if
it had been categorized as such. Instead, it was probably
done and seen as a helpful gesture to a young barrister
who was anxious to provide a good service for a lay client.
an overworked court. Thus the judge can employ
discount on sentencing in exchange for a guilty
plea. However, this process cannot be presented
publicly in terms of cost effectiveness of the court's
time or in fine semantic distinctions.6 Instead it is
justified through the accused's contrition and re-
morse which provide grounds for mitigation. Pub-
lic degradation ceremonies61 are maintained by the
judiciary seeking public reasons for discounts on
sentences.
It is important that if counsel is to advise his
client on the likely sentencing response of the judge
that there must be a predictable judicial pattern
and the expectation that the bargain will be hon-
ored. Predictability is enhanced by such statements
as that made by Mr. Justice Ackner. While sent-
encing two men convicted of rape, he stated that
if they had pleaded guilty they would have been
jailed for about two years. Because they had not,
he jailed them for three years: "Let me make this
abundantly clear, since it does not seem to have
penetrated very fully to the criminal fraternity,
that the courts grant a discount to those who show
contrition, to those who recognize their guit."'n
Coupled with the knowledge of the existence of
discount must be the confidence that it will be
applied if a guilty plea is offered. Thus in R. v. de
Haan63 the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence
imposed by the trial judge because insufficient
attention had been paid to the plea: "A confession
of guilt should tell in favour of an accused person,
for that is clearly in the public interest ... to
sentence this man ... to four and a half years is to
give inadequate consideration to that miti-
60 R. v. Harper, [1968] 2 Q.B. 108, 110 (Parker, L.C.J.):
This court feels that it is quite improper to use
language which may convey that a man is being
sentenced because he has pleaded guilty, or because
he has run his defence in a particular way. It is,
however, of course proper to give a man a lesser
sentence if he has shown genuine remorse amongst
other things by pleading guilty.
See also R. v. Beham, R. v. Anderson. R. v. Qayyum, The
Times (London), July 28, 1967, at 13, col. 7 (C.A.), R. v.
Hall, [1968] 2 Q.B. 787. "Discount" is also given in other
situations, for example, because of co-operation with the
police, R. v. Alston, 1967 CRIM. L. Rav. 488.
61 See Garfinkle, Conditions of Successful Degradation Cere-
monies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420 (1955).
62 The Times (London), Feb. 10, 1976, at 5, col. 7. See
generally on the matter of "discount" R. CRoss, THE
ENGLISH SENTENCING SYSTEM (2d ed. 1975); C.
THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 52, 195 (1970).6
3[1968]2 Q.B. 11.
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gating element."" The interest of appellate courts
in the predictable sentencing policy of trial court
judges was expressed recently in R. v. Deary.65 Coun-
sel for the appellant went to see thejudge in private
to ask him, in substance, whether a custodial sen-
tence was likely whatever the nature of the plea.
The judge, who had a recorder and was sitting
with two lay magistrates, said "you are safe" which
was understood to mean that in no event would a
custodial sentence be imposed. Nevertheless a cus-
todial sentence was given because it was discovered
that the recorder was outvoted by the magistrates.
The Court of Appeal was concerned that the trial
court had "gone back on its word and that some
sense of grievance might be felt by the appellant
and his family."' ' The appeal was allowed and a
non-custodial sentence was substituted, which
among other things, reaffirmed the confidence of
those who gave and received advice about the
sentencing patterns of judges. Not only must the
sentencing scale be predictable, an indication of
which may be obtained either through access to
the judge in the privacy of his chambers or more
generally by means of numerous appearances in
front of him in the crown court, but also the
barrister must be confident that the "contract"
executed by the defendant will be honored by the
court. Appeal courts appear to support such bar-
gains, but the defendant is unable to offer his plea
publicly in terms of a contract for a reduced sen-
tence. It must be couched in terms of remorse and
contrition. However, there is some evidence to
suggest that at this level the defendant is being
brought into the picture and told that repentance
is rewarded: "It was trite to say that a plea of guilty
would generally attract a somewhat lighter sen-
r Id.
65 The Times (London), June 9, 1976, at 18, col. 8. See
1977 CRIM. L. R v. 47.
6 Id. See also, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971). Santobello was charged with two felonies, both
gambling offenses. He agreed to plead guilty to a minor
charge of possessing gambling records in the second
degree in return for the prosecution dropping the other
charges and agreeing not to make any recommendation
on the sentence. Owing to a misunderstanding caused by
a change in the prosecution lawyer, the prosecution did
in fact make a recommendation of a maximum sentence
of one year. That sentence was imposed despite the
protests of the defense, the judge saying that he had not
been influenced by the recommendation. The U.S. Su-
preme Court set aside the sentence, saying that plea-
bargaining was "an essential component of the adminis-
tration ofjustice." Id. at 260.
tence than a plea of not guilty after a full dress
contest on the issue. Everybody knew that it was
so, and there was no doubt about it. Any accused
person who did not know about it should know it.
The sooner he knew the better."' ' Now the accused
is informed that in order to receive a reduced
sentence he must plead guilty and formally act
with remorse or be labelled contrite.68 Nevertheless,
the judge remains divorced from the accused who
in his ignorance has been a passive object in a
different and private relationship which has
molded his future.
The administration of criminal justice in En-
gland and Wales is a highly complex affair which
is under increasing pressure from growing crime
rates and inadequate budgetary resources for the
police, courts, social services and prisons to keep
pace. In such an environment it is a natural eco-
nomic quest for short cuts that leads to plea bar-
gaining. Nevertheless this would be considered no
justification for such a formal development.6 9
Criminal justice is expected to be a social lesson
and through the ceremonies of law enforcement
society's values are affirmed and made visible to
all. The model developed in this article incorpo-
rates a visible judicial stance of non-intervention
in the defendant's decision to plead, thereby re-
sponding to the public expectation of the judicial
role. Simultaneously, pressures within and imposed
upon the court may be alleviated by the clandes-
tine opportunities provided to the judiciary and
counsel to speed the trial to an early conclusion. It
might be attractive to think that R. v. Cain, the
most recent reported case concerning judicial in-
terference in the pleading decision, is an unusual
6 R. v. Cain, The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1976, at
11 (Widgery, L.CJ.). However, the Practice Direction of
July 26, 1976 probably requires that Turner should be
interpreted as prohibiting such statements for if the judge
makes one, it must be reported to the defendant, who will
then regard counsel's advice as an expression of the
judge's views and so be deprived of the opportunity of
making a completely free choice. This Practice Direction
reinforces the covert practice. See R. v. Plimmer, 11975]
61 Crim. App. 264, 266; 40J. CRIM. L. 153 (1976).
68 Note the opinion of Carlen, Remedial Routines for the
Maintenance of Control in Magistrates' Courts, supra note 40,
where she argues that remorse and contrition are treated
as variable terms to minimize the problems of manage-
ment faced by magistrates at the sentencing stage.
69 "There is something more than convenience and
expedition. Above all there is the proper administration
of the criminal justice to be considered." R. v. Coe, [ 1969]
1 All E.R. 65, 67 (Lord Parker).
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example arising out of the actions of an intemper-
ate judge, Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson. 0 I have
70 See R. v. McFadden, The Times (London), Dec. 11,
1975, at 5, col. 3 (C.A.); his conduct in the Cambridge
"Garden House Riot" case in 1970; The Times (London),
Feb. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 5; The Times (London), Feb. 25,
1976, at 2, col. 6; and the Western Mail, Feb. 21, 1976,
at 4, col. 1. See also Sir Peter Rawlinson, The Times
(London), Dec. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1:119 SOLIcrroR's J.
33; 1975 LEGAL ACT. GROUP BULL. 283-84.
attempted to illustrate that such an analysis would
be misleading. Examination of the superior courts,
recent cases and professional and client relation-
ships reveals a social and institutional framework
which allows influential judicial opinion to filter
through to the ignorant defendant. A rose is a rose
by any other name: judicial plea bargaining is
alive, well and living in the English courts.
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